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Assessing the Cost and Benefits of 
Collective Bargaining: 
The Potential Use of Costing 
Gilbert Levine 
This paper présents the union point of view on collective 
bargaining costing. 
With my background of labour research in the public sector, I must 
admit that I find it strange to write on « The potential use of costing ». 
I strongly suspect that the use of costing is much further advanced in 
private sector collective bargaining. Indeed, only in the last few years, as 
more public employer bargainers with an industrial background hâve 
entered the scène, has the matter of costing the seulement become an 
issue. 
First, let me state my bias. As a committed trade unionist, I start 
from the premise that I want to see working people of Canada obtain a 
fair return for their labour. From what little I hâve observed about 
costing of collective agreement settlements, I am convinced that it has 
been used by management as a sophisticated device to deprive workers 
of a fair and just seulement. It is not so much the use of costing that 
concerns me, it is the abuse. My paper might better be entitled : « The 
Abuse of Costing ». 
As some of the abuses of costing are cited, it should very quickly 
become clear why I am opposed to the présent manner in which collective 
agreements are costed. 
In récent years public employers hâve seized on a distorted form 
of the costing technique as one of the most effective tools of bargaining. 
The formula simply requires adding up ail of the union's initial bargain-
ing proposais, multiplying the amount by several thousand employées, 
and further multiplying that amount over two or three years. Depending 
on the size of the bargaining unit 
and the term of the collective agree-
ment, employers can easily corne up 
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with cost figures on the millions of dollars in their attemps to depict the 
public employée as a selfish extortionist who is prepared to hold up his 
community for ransom and to upset the économie stability of the nation. 
This new collective bargaining technique may be called the « new 
math » of labour relations. It consists of an attempt to create a public 
impression that a fairly modest union request is an outrageous one. The 
purveyors of this technique rely heavily on : 
a) « How to Lie with Statistics » — that famous little book appears 
to be a must on the reading list of ail public employer negotiators. 
b) « The Big Lie » — the bigger the lie, the more likely it is to be 
believed by the public. 
What are some of the major éléments of this « new math » approach ? 
COST EVERYTHING 
Every union request must be charged at maximum cost. If a union 
requests one day's paid leave of absence in the case of the death of a 
grand-parent, the management cost analyst maximizes the cosl; of this 
request by assuming that every union member's grand-parents will die 
within the year. The same procédure may also be applied to union pro-
posais for paid jury duty leave, time off for grievances, emergency call-in 
pay, etc. In this way the employer can easily inflate the union's request 
into a mythical million. 
This technique was attempted by City and Métro Toronto in 1972 
negotiations and resulted in a five week strike of Toronto's municipal 
manual workers, members of CUPE Local 43. In this instance, the Em-
ployers stated in a brief to an arbitration board which was subsequently 
estiblished to résolve the dispute : 
« The gross wage and benefit package for a labourer in 
the City of Toronto Streets Department before any adjustments 
in 1972 was in excess of $10,000. » 
The $10,000 figure was arrived at by adding a fringe benefit amount 
of $2,635. to a labourer's annual salary rate of $7,475. to arrive at an 
amount of $10,110. However, included in the $2,635. amount for « non 
productive pay » were items such as vacation time, sick leave, holidays, 
etc., ail of which were already included in the annual salary rate. It is 
obvious that an employée does not get paid twice for his vacation time, 
holiday, and sick leave. By eliminating this exercice in double counting, 
the real cost of the fringe benefits in this instance is reduced from $2,635 
to $1,470 per annum. The fringes were worth 19.6% of the labourer's 
income and not 35% as claimed by the employers. 
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The « cost everything » and compound it approach in Toronto was 
used to scare taxpayers with statements that the union's demands would 
cost the average homeowner $135. By the time double counting and 
other padding was eliminated, and the multiplier effect was removed, the 
union estimated the real cost of its proposais for 1972 amounted to just 
over $10. per Métro Toronto household. 
USE THE MULTIPLIER 
This is very useful in large bargaining units. It consists of multiplying 
the wage request by the number of employées over the period of the 
collective agreement. An offered increase of $1.00 per week in each year 
of a three year collective agreement may not appear like much. But 
surely the public will be impressed by an increase of $1.3 million. That 
$1.3 million proposai represents the same $1.00 per week increase spread 
over three years for 5,000 employées. 
The most glaring example of this multiplier technique occured last 
year in negotiations between the Province of Québec and the Common 
Front. Since the negotiations covered almost 250,000 public and para 
public employées, it was not difficult for the Government to make a 
mind-boggling offer which it stated was worth $230,000,000 ! Since this 
seemingly large offer covered such a large group of employées and was 
spread over a period of three years, it was turned down. In the most 
elaborate public relations efforts in the history of Canadian industrial 
relations, the Québec Government tried, and failed, to convince the union 
members and public that this was a generous offer. In fact, this quarter 
of a billion dollar wage offer did not meet the union's minimum wage 
goal of only $100. per week. It did not even provide for a wage increase 
sufficient to cover the increases in the cost of living. 
ONLY USE "GLOBAL" STATISTICS 
The technique requires the employer to use total « cost » statistics 
and avoid any breakdown of cost estimâtes. This makes it easier for 
the employer to pad his figures. It makes it impossible to verify the 
information. It also helps to create the public impression that ail of the 
« exhorbitant » package costs will be in the form of wage increases. 
INCLUDE THE "COSTS" OF ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE EMPLOYER 
Although the bargaining unit may only include a relatively small 
proportion of ail of the employées of the employer, the technique includes 
adding onto the « costs » at least a similar increase to ail other employées 
excluded from the bargaining unit. 
Public employers often state that any improvement in wages and 
benefits negotiated by manual or production employées must also be 
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passed on to supervisory, administrative and clérical staff. In this way 
the employer greatly inflates the impact of the union's position. 
Possibly the most glaring example of compounding the impact of a 
wage increase occured a décade ago when CUPE was attempting to nego-
tiate for employées of the Western Mémorial Hospital in Corner Brook, 
Newfoundland. A Royal Commission was established to investigate the 
problems arising out of a strike in which the hospital employées were 
attempting to win a wage increase above their magnificent rate of $21. 
per week. The Provincial Government argued before the Commission 
that, if the few dollars per week requested by the maids were granted in 
this one instance, it would also hâve to be given to ail other employées 
in the Hospital. If the Corner Brook hospital employées received this 
increase, the Government argued that an equal increase would also hâve 
to be given to ail employées in 30 other Newfoundland hospitals at a 
cost of $1,390,000. If ail the hospital employées received a wage increase, 
then an equal increase would hâve to be given to ail provincial civil 
servants, teachers, and others. By the time the Province made full use 
of the multiplier effect, the $2.00 per week increase requested by the 
few maids in Corner Brook had snowballed into a $3 million provincial 
wage bill. 
MAKE THE MAXIMUM PROPOSAL APPEAR AS A MINIMUM DEMAND 
The current ritual of collective bargaining requires the union to 
inflate its initial proposai well beyond what it expects the seulement to be. 
Continuing the ritual, the employer makes an equally ridiculous offer, 
well below the level at which he expects to settle. The technique requires 
the employer to take the union's first proposais very seriously and to 
consider the initial maximum proposai as a minimum demand. The anti-
union news média, who are completely unable or unwilling to scrutinize 
the cost analysis of the employers, publicize thèse inflated « facts » not 
only to alienate the public from the union but also to neutralize the active 
support of the union members. 
COST BOTH THE STATUTORY AND 
NON-STATUTORY BENEFITS 
Included in the employée benefit package are many matters which 
the employer is required to pay as a resuit of fédéral and provincial 
statutes and not as a resuit of employée or union action. I contend that 
the statutory benefits such as Workmen's Compensation, Canada Pension 
Plan, unemployment Insurance, 4% vacation pay, etc., should be segre-
gated from payroll costs and not counted in any fringe benefit costing 
procédures. 
For example, the laws of ail labour jurisdictions provide for em-
ployers to pay for a minimum of two weeks vacation per year, or 4% 
of payroll. Let us assume that a union negotiates a standard thiree week 
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vacation with pay or 6% of payroll. The employer inevitably records this 
as 6% payroll costs arising out of union action. However, the facts are 
that 4% of the vacation benefit arises out of législative action and only 
2% of the benefit arises out of union action. Even though they are botn 
real expenditures for any employer, any fair settlement costing procédure 
should only cost those matters which arise out of union action. If this 
was done, the cost of any settlement package would be drastically reduced. 
In a review CUPE condueted of ail fringe benefits available to em-
ployées of the City of Toronto, it was found that 42% of the cost of 
fringes resulted from statutory provisions. It is doubtful whether many 
employers would want to get involved in costing settlements if 42% of 
the costs were rightfully removed from the calculations. 
It is because of thèse examples of misuse of costing that most unions 
refuse to get involved in the game. And it is just that — a game ! 
In spite of some récent attempts to do a more honest cost analysis 
most examples of costing by employers are simply a System of adding up 
the « cost » of each new union proposai. No effort is normally made to 
measure and deduct the value of any « savings » to the employer resulting 
from the implementation of the union's proposais. The following examples 
are cited to explain how this simplified method of costing grossly distorts 
the financial impact of union proposais : 
Under the simplified costing method, réductions in actual 
paid time worked are merely costed as one day's pay for each 
additional holiday, one week's pay for each extra week of vaca-
tion, one half hour's pay for each half hour réduction in daily 
working hours, etc. But there is an abundance of évidence to 
prove that more leisure time has resulted in increased produeti-
vity. Yet employers who only cost the impact of the reduced time 
worked make no effort to measure the offsetting gains of increas-
ed productivity. Similarly, a 15 minute paid rest period which 
results in increased productivity and a lower accident rate can-
not simply be costed at one-quarter of an hour's wages. 
Employers often fully cost the value of increased pension costs re-
sulting from an earlier retirement program. Little or no effort is made 
to put a value on the benefits resulting from a younger, more productive 
work force. 
Similarly employers fully charge against a settlement, the cost of re-
training programs without any compensation for the higher productivity 
resulting from the more highly skilled work force. 
Employers will fully charge against their settlement costs any enrich-
ment of premium pay for overtime work. However, most employées do 
not consider premium pay for overtime as an employée benefit. They 
consider it as a penalty against the employer for poor administration or 
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faulty planning and scheduling of production. If such is the case, why 
should the inadéquate planning and administration be chalked up against 
the union as part of the seulement costs ? 
Is it fair for employers to merely cost the paid time spent in grievance 
handling without attempting to calculate the more than compensating 
gains in increased productivity resulting from a more satisfied work 
force ? 
Is it fair to cost the impact of wage increases for women workers 
resulting from the implementation of equal pay for equal work législation? 
Since this has been considered a socially désirable goal for many years, 
should the union not deduct from the cost of his matter the money saved 
by the employer because of the previous years of cheating his female 
employées ? 
In costing the seulement package employers artificially inflate the 
value of employée benefits by not crediting returns arising from favourable 
expérience. Insurance companies normally rebate a portion of the premium 
costs to the employers for favourable expérience in group life plans, 
weekly indemnity plans, drug and dental insurance plans. Thèse rebates 
should, but never are, deducted from the initial cost of the programs. A 
CUPE study of typical group life plans revealed that rebates ranged from 
10% to 40% of gross premiums. By not crediting thèse rebates, the 
cost estimâtes of thèse plans are completely distorted. 
The employée benefit which is probably most grossly over costed 
is the employer payment of pensions. Most employers who pay 4% of 
earnings towards pension would mark that down as a 4% payroll expen-
diture. But in actual fact, under Canadian tax laws, pension costs can be 
deducted from current operating revenue and deducted from corporation 
income tax. Further, many firms and governments invest the pension funds 
in their own firms and, in effect, are able to « loan » themselves money 
at greatly reduced rates of interest. In the case of the fédéral Superannua-
tion Plan, a trust fund exists on paper only, with actual benefits being 
paid out of Consolidated revenue. Thèse practices would hâve the effect 
of reducing real pension costs by approximately one half. In other words, 
the 4% pension payroll cost chargea! against the union may only cost the 
employer 2% in real terms. 
Ail Systems of estimating seulement costs are based on two false 
assumptions, namely that : 
1 ) there will be no other changes during the term of the collective 
agreement. 
2) hourly compensation and labour costs are one and the same 
thing. 
Let us examine how thèse assumptions distort the estimated costs of 
settlements. 
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It is obvious that changes during the term of the agreement in the sex, 
âge, and occupational composition of the work force will hâve a strong 
effect on pension, vacation and other labour costs. Employers may also 
change work methods in response to negotiated penalties. For example, 
an employer who costed in his package seulement the value of an increase 
in overtime penalty pay from time and one half to double time, may as 
a resuit décide to eliminate ail forms of overtime. This change in existing 
practices then results in lesser costs, not higher costs as was estimated in 
the settlement. 
The false assumption is made that increased compensation in the 
form of wages and benefits will automatically resuit in increased labour 
costs. However, labour costs are influenced by changes in hourly wage 
rates and changes in productivity resulting from technological and other 
changes. There are of course, many examples of réductions in unit labour 
costs taking place concurrently with increased wage costs. Yet in thèse 
types of settlements the amount of the wage increase is costed against the 
union's requests, in spite of the reduced unit labour costs. 
In the game of assessing the costs and benefits of a collective bar-
gaining settlement, the employer is in a favoured position. The union 
normally does not hâve access to ail the employment data on which any 
accurate costing information must be based. Most employers in Canada 
are reluctant to make this type of information fully available to unions, 
in a manner in which the information may be verified. Unions in such 
a disadvantaged position should never get caught in the costing game. 
Should worst corne to worst and the costing technique become a part 
of the industrial relations scène, it will be important for the disadvantaged 
unions to hâve législative protection. 
Most urgently needed is a Welfare Disclosures Act compelling em-
ployers to divulge full information on employée benefit costs prior to the 
commencement of bargaining. Such an Act has been in effect in the United 
States for many years and is long overdue in Canada. 
Unions will also continue to press for a social security System more 
akin to the European pattern where thèse benefits are covered by légis-
lation and are not a subject of collective bargaining. For example, in 
those provinces of Canada which hâve abolished medicare premiums 
and the cost of medicare is paid out of Consolidated revenue, this issue 
is removed from the bargaining table. Aside from the obvious benefits 
of socializing the costs of thèse social security benefits, this removes the 
problem of costing the benefit as part of a package settlement. Unions 
believe the simplest formula for costing is to remove ail of thèse social 
security benefits from bargaining and cover them by législation. Unions 
then will concentrate their bargaining on wages and working conditions. 
This is by far the best formula to remove any controversy about costing 
techniques. 
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In the meantime, for ail of the above reasons, and more, unions will 
remain very cautious about costing proposed or actual settlement packages. 
Unions will continue to look upon the costing technique as a management 
negotiating tool to inflate and distort the real cost of a union's bargaining 
proposais. Effective unions will bargain for benefits instead of bargaining 
on the basis of costs. They will bargain for collective agreement provisions 
and benefits on their merits and on the needs of their members, regard-
less of some distorted management cost estimâtes. 
L'argument du coût dans les négociations collectives 
Le recours à l'argument du « coût » dans les négociations collectives apparaît 
être nettement abusif. Au cours des dernières années, l'État-employeur a mis au 
point une technique d'évaluation du coût des négociations qui est singulièrement 
trompeuse. La formule est simple. Il ne s'agit que d'additionner les demandes 
initiales du syndicat, de multiplier la somme ainsi obtenue par le nombre des em-
ployés et de la multiplier une fois de plus par deux ou par trois selon la durée de 
la convention collective projetée. Suivant le cadre de l'unité de négociation et la 
durée de la convention, on peut arriver à des sommes astronomiques et faire croire 
aux contribuables que les employés des entreprises publiques veulent les extorquer 
et qu'ils sont à la veille de mettre la stabilité économique du pays en danger. 
Au fond, la tactique consiste à tenter de créer dans l'opinion publique l'im-
pression qu'une revendication plutôt modérée du syndicat est fort exagérée. Les 
tenants de cette technique s'appuient sur le « Comment mentir avec les statistiques ? » 
et le « Plus le mensonge est grossier plus il a de chance d'être cru ». 
Pour atteindre ce but, on procédera ainsi : toute demande du syndicat doit être 
évaluée au prix fort. Si le syndicat demande une journée de congé de deuil payée 
à l'occasion du décès du grand-père ou de la grand-mère d'un employé, l'employeur 
estimera que chaque employé perdra ses grands-parents pendant l'année. En voici 
une illustration. Au cours des négociations à la communauté urbaine de Toronto, 
pour faire ressortir le taux élevé du salaire du manœvre, on y avait ajouté une 
somme de $2,635.00 qui était censée représenter le coût des avantages sociaux. Or, 
il s'est avéré que ceci comprenait les sommes accordées pour vacances, congés payés 
et congés de maladie qui étaient déjà incluses dans le taux de salaire. Une fois cette 
somme déduite, le montant initial s'est trouvé réduit à $1,470.00 par année, et les 
avantages accessoires ne s'établissaient plus à 35 pour cent, mais à moins de 20 
pour cent du revenu de l'employé. 
Une autre façon d'impressionner le public, c'est le recours à l'effet multipli-
cateur, principalement dans le cas des grandes unités de négociation. Une augmen-
tation de $1.00 par semaine par année pour une convention de trois ans, c'est peu. 
Mais si le groupe compte 5,000 travailleurs, cela fait tout de même la jolie somme 
de $1,300,000.00. Les négociations dans le secteur public au Québec sont une bonne 
illustration de la tactique. On a fait danser devant l'opinion publique le chiffre 
fabuleux de $250,000,000.00. Mais on n'a guère insisté pour dire que 250,000 sala-
riés étaient en cause dans l'affaire. 
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On recourt encore à l'utilisation des statistiques globales, ce qui permet d'éviter 
l'estimation de la valeur relative des coûts pour chaque demande. On inclut aussi 
dans ces estimations tous les salariés de l'entreprise sous prétexte qu'il faudra accor-
der des avantages identiques aux employés qui ne font pas partie de l'unité de 
négociation. Il arrive même que l'on pousse encore plus loin. À Terre-Neuve, il y 
a quelques années, on négociait à un hôpital de Corner Brook les salaires des fem-
mes de ménage qui étaient alors en grève. Il était question d'une majoration de 
$2.00 par semaine. Le gouvernement soutint qu'il devait accorder la même augmen-
tation dans 30 autres hôpitaux et que le tout s'élèverait à $1,390,000.00. À un 
moment donné même, ce chiffre a atteint la somme de trois millions, car il fallait 
accorder cette majoration à tous les employés du gouvernement. C'est l'argument 
de la boule de neige qu'on fait grossir en la roulant. 
Une des tactiques utilisées consiste à considérer les demandes initiales du syn-
dicat qui sont généralement un peu gonflées comme sa réclamation minimale. Les 
journaux antisyndicaux se hâtent de publier ces chiffres impressionnants, non seule-
ment pour berner les gens, mais aussi pour neutraliser l'appui des membres eux-
mêmes. 
Il importe de signaler d'autres points. On inclut aussi dans l'estimation le coût 
des contributions pour les accidents du travail, l'assurance-chômage, l'assurance-ma-
ladie, les rentes. Il est certain que ces montants ne devraient pas être inclus. Il 
devrait en être ainsi des deux premières semaines de vacances annuelles qui sont 
imposées par la loi partout au Canada. En effet, on estime à 42 pour cent du coût 
de l'ensemble des avantages sociaux ceux qui sont imposés par des mesures législa-
tives. 
Il s'agit là uniquement des facteurs à incidence directe qu'on peut compter. 
Jamais on ne fait entrer en ligne de compte l'accroissement de la productivité attri-
buable à la réduction de la durée du travail, à la retraite prématurée, à la meilleure 
formation professionnelle du personnel. 
En réalité, le calcul des « coûts » dans la négociation collective repose sur deux 
hypothèses fausses : il ne se produira aucun changement dans le cours de la con-
vention collective ; le taux de salaire et le coût du travail sont une seule et même 
chose. 
Des changements se produisent en cours de convention dans le sexe, l'âge et 
la composition professionnelle des effectifs qui ne sont pas sans avoir beaucoup 
d'effet sur le coût du travail. Le changement dans les méthodes de travail doit 
aussi être considéré, car il y a nombre d'exemples où le coût par unité de travail 
a diminué même après la concession de majorations de salaire. 
On peut conclure que l'employeur se trouve dans une situation privilégiée pour 
ce qui est de l'estimation du « coût » d'une négociation collective. 
En guise de conclusion, deux suggestions concrètes : il devrait y avoir une loi 
qui oblige les employeurs à fournir aux syndicats dès le début des négociations 
collectives des renseignements exacts sur ces questions ; de même, les centrales syn-
dicales devraient continuer à faire pression pour que le coût des mesures de sécurité 
sociale imposées par la loi soit assumé par les gouvernements à même leurs revenus 
ordinaires. 
